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Abstract
Recent empirical research has demonstrated that countries with higher levels of religiosity
are characterized by greater income inequality. We argue that this is due to the lower level of
government services demanded in more religious countries. Religion requires that individuals
make financial sacrifices and this leads the religious to prefer making their contributions
voluntarily rather than through mandatory means. To the extent that citizen preferences
are reflected in policy outcomes, religiosity results in lower taxes, which in turn implies
lower levels of spending on both public goods and redistribution. Since measures of income
typically do not fully take into account the part of income coming from donations received,
this increases measured income inequality. We formalize these ideas in a general equilibrium
political economy model and also show that the implications of our model are supported by
cross-country data.
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1 Introduction
The economic effects of religion have now been analyzed by researchers for a quite long period
of time. Arguably, Weber (1905) was among the first to argue that religion plays a significant
role in economic development. The development of the literature on economics of religion
using modern economic techniques, however, is fairly recent.1 Following the seminal work
of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), economists have explored the potential interactions between
religion and a variety of socio-economic variables. For example, Lehrer and Chiswick (1993)
investigated religion’s effects on marriages, Lehrer (1995), Lehrer (1996), and Lehrer (1999)
on labor supply, fertility, and educational attainment, respectively. Barro and McLeary
(2002, 2006), on the other hand, analyzed what role religion plays in the evolution of various
economic variables, and Barro and McLeary (2003a, 2003b) and Jaffe (2005) of economic
development, and Huber (2005) of social policy attitudes.
More recently, research on the relationship between religion and its socio-economic cor-
relates has demonstrated that countries with higher levels of religiosity are characterized by
higher levels of income inequality (Palani 2008, Rees 2009). This interesting empirical finding
leaves open the question of which leads to which, however, as interactions between religiosity
and income inequality potentially involve two directions of causation. One one side, a more
unequal society may cause agents to feel less secure, both materially and spiritually, and
this may lead them to turn to religion as a source of comfort (Rees 2009). According to this
view, more unequal nations would be more religious as a consequence. On the other side,
religiosity may help individuals better cope with adverse life events, reducing their incentive
to fight serious shortcomings such as income inequality, thereby allowing it to persist (Palani
2008).2 This line of reasoning would lead us to expect more severe income inequalities in
nations with higher levels of religiosity.
In this paper, we offer an alternative theoretical mechanism through which religiosity
1See Iannacone (1998) for a review of the early literature.
2Although this mechanism about causality is plausible, Palani provides no theoretical or empirical support
for it in her paper.
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might lead to greater income inequality. Unlike the abovementioned studies that focus
on the role of religion in providing personal security and a coping mechanism with socio-
economic hardships, our argument emphasizes religion’s role in establishing clear behavioral
rules that are to be followed by its adherents. Many of these rules point out the necessity and
appropriateness of certain types of actions that require costly sacrifices. Among these costly
actions, a very important one is making financial sacrifices, that is, giving up some of what
you have for the sake of your belief. These resources might then be used in the provision of
collective goods such as financial assistance to the poor and needy (redistribution) and/or in
the financing of various types of public goods (and services). Religious teaching often involves
an inherent promise of reward for this type of behavior.3 Recent empirical work by Brooks
(2003, 2005) and Thornton and Helms (2010) have shown that religion does indeed motivate
individuals to make voluntary donations, suggesting that religious individuals might derive
greater enjoyment from giving as compared to secular individuals.
The role of religion in influencing people’s giving attitudes has an important politico-
economic implication: Keeping all else equal, religious individuals would prefer to make
their financial contributions to collective goods privately and voluntarily rather than through
mandatory means. As such, when compared with secular individuals, religious individuals
on average are likely to prefer lower levels of spending by the state (be it on public goods or
redistribution), as this increases their disposable income out of which voluntary donations
are to be made. If policy outcomes reflect variation in citizen preferences, then we can also
expect countries with higher levels of religiosity to have lower levels of government taxation
and spending. Put differently, we can expect the size of the government to be smaller in
countries with higher levels of religiosity.4
3For more on this, see McCleary (2007), who explores the differences across major world religions in
beliefs related to an afterlife, and how these variations in beliefs translate into differences in incentives for
economic activity, charitable giving, and so on.
4A similar argument appears also in Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004), Clark and Lelkes (2004), and Scheve
and Stasavage (2006), who argue that religion and state welfare spending are substitute mechanisms for
providing social insurance. They do not, however, claim a negative relationship between religiosity and the
overall size of the government (understood as including spending on public goods and services in addition
to spending on welfare), as we do in this paper.
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We next argue that this negative relationship between religiosity and government size
is key to understanding the positive relationship between religiosity and income inequality.
Religiosity affects the distribution of income potentially in two opposing ways. On the one
hand, since governments of countries with higher levels of religiosity are likely to be smaller,
they will have fewer resources to devote to redistributive purposes, and this tends to harm
the distribution of income (equality-reducing effect). On the other hand, religiosity could also
work to improve the distribution of income in a country since it increases people’s willingness
to make voluntary donations to the poor (equality-increasing effect). While this latter effect
of religion is sound in principle, it is unlikely to be reflected in measures of income inequality,
at least not fully. This is because measures of income (on which measures of income inequality
are based) typically do not fully take into account the part of income coming from donations
received. As a result, the equality-reducing effect of religion dominates its equality-increasing
effect, thereby increasing measured income inequality.
We formalize these ideas within the context of a simple general equilibrium political-
economy model along the lines of Meltzer and Richard (1981). The government collects
taxes and uses the proceeds to finance a public good and redistribution from the rich to the
poor. Agents are heterogenous only in their exogenously given initial incomes. Following
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) and Andreoni (1989) among others, we model religiosity as the
intensity of the satisfaction derived from making voluntary donations (a form of warm-glow).
As such, religiosity motivates agents to contribute voluntarily to the provision of potentially
both public goods and redistribution. We then show that, for a given tax rate, a higher
level of religiosity results in larger voluntary contributions in equilibrium, thereby improving
the actual -but not necessarily the measured- distribution of income (the equality-increasing
effect).
We next embed this model in a previous stage where agents collectively decide on the
tax rate in the economy. Differences in initial incomes translate into different preferences
over the tax rate. We consider a median voter rule whereby the equilibrium tax rate is the
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one chosen by the agent with median income. The first result of the paper is that, under
mild assumptions, a higher level of religiosity results in a lower equilibrium tax rate. The
intuition behind this result is simple. Once an optimal amount of the public good has been
secured, religiosity means that agents prefer to carry out redistribution voluntarily rather
than through mandatory means, as agents derive direct satisfaction from making voluntary
donations but not from government-imposed contributions in the form of taxes. Our second
result follows immediately from the first one: Since a higher level of religiosity results in
a lower equilibrium tax rate, it also leads to lower levels of the public good and public
redistribution in equilibrium; that is, a smaller government. The fall in public redistribution,
in turn, increases income inequality in the economy (the equality-reducing effect).
We also use our model to explore the implications of religiosity for consumption inequal-
ity, only to find that the relationship between the two variables is ambiguous. Therefore, it
is theoretically possible for a country with a relatively high income inequality to be charac-
terized by a relatively low consumption inequality.
We test the predictions of our model empirically using cross-country data. Our data on
religiosity are drawn from the World Values survey conducted in 2000 which contains various
questions that can be used as the basis for an index of religiosity. In this paper, we use the
“belief in afterlife” index due to its proximity to our theoretical modeling of religion, but we
also check the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of religiosity. Consistent with
Palani (2008) and Rees (2009), we find that there is a significant positive correlation between
religiosity and income inequality across a wide spectrum of countries including both advanced
and less advanced countries. We next show that there is a negative correlation between
religiosity and state welfare spending, thus confirming the findings of Gill and Lundsgaarde
(2004) and Scheve and Stasavage (2006). However, we go beyond these studies and show
that a negative correlation is also present between religiosity and total government spending
as well as between religiosity and government spending excluding spending on welfare. This
finding suggests that the religious might have an inherent preference for a smaller state and
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that a smaller welfare spending observed in more religious countries documented by these
studies is just a manifestation of this more general outlook. All of these empirical findings
are consistent with the predictions coming from our theoretical model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical model and presents the
main results. Section 3 tests model predictions empirically using cross-country data. Section
4 provides concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 The Basic Framework
We consider an endowment economy populated by a large number of agents/individuals
each of whom has an exogenously given before-tax before-transfer income of w ∈ [0,∞).
Individuals are distributed along the continuum according to a continuous and atomless
cumulative distribution function F (w), where F (0) = 0 and F (∞) = 1.
Individuals derive utility from consumption c, voluntary donations z, and government-
provided public goods G according to U(c, z) = log(c) + γ log(z) + log(G). While c and z
are individual choice variables, G is determined as the outcome of a political process and is
taken as given by individuals when making consumption and donation decisions. The term
γ(≥ 0) in the agent’s utility function denotes the relative importance attached to charitable
donations and is assumed to be motivated by a belief in the afterlife; i.e. religiosity. We
assume that the stronger this belief, the higher the value attached to charitable donations,
that is, the higher is the parameter γ. The donations are collected in a pool and then
distributed equally among the agents in the economy (equal treatment). Each agent receives
a constant amount equal to b.5
Tax revenues finance the public good G and lump-sum redistribution of v units of con-
sumption per capita. The tax rate, τ , is a constant fraction of income. Out of all tax
revenue collected, a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) goes to redistribution and the rest to the provision of
5Therefore, we assume that donations are used only for direct redistributive purposes. People donate also
to public goods and services. Extending the model in this direction is reasonable and would likely strengthen
the main results of our paper, but it would add little additional insight to our analysis.
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the public good.
Taking as given the tax rate, τ , the level of redistribution, v, and the amount of donations,
b, an individual with income w chooses the level of consumption, c(w) ≥ 0, and the level of
voluntary donations, z(w) ≥ 0, to solve:
max log(c(w)) + γ log(z(w)) + log(G)
s.t.
c(w) + z(w) ≤ (1− τ)w + v + b (1)
The right hand-side of (1) is the agent’s income after taxes and transfers, including the
donations received. For brevity, we call this after-tax income in the sequel.
Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that the optimal choices of consumption and voluntary
donation are constant fractions of after-tax income:
c(w) =
1
1 + γ
((1− τ)w + v + b). (2)
z(w) =
γ
1 + γ
((1− τ)w + v + b). (3)
A tax-transfer policy (τ, v) must satisfy the government’s budget constraints
v = ατw¯, (4)
and,
G = (1− α)τw¯, (5)
where w¯ ≡ ∫∞
0
wdF (w) is average income.
In addition, economywide donations made must equal donations received:
b =
∫ ∞
0
z(w)dF (w). (6)
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Given the tax rate τ , the system of equations (2)-(6) characterizes the equilibrium of the
economy.
The tax policy actually chosen depends on the collective choice mechanism by which
preferences are aggregated. If all agents have identical preferences over the tax rate, the
collective choice problem is trivial: The equilibrium tax rate is the one preferred by all the
agents. However, heterogeneity of incomes implies that different individuals prefer different
tax rates. To see this, we first eliminate b from the system by expressing it in terms of τ :
Inserting (4) in (3) and then inserting (3) in (6), we can write
b =
∫ ∞
0
γ
1 + γ
[w(1− τ) + ατw¯ + b]dF (w), (7)
which can be solved to yield:
b = γw¯ − (1− α)γw¯τ. (8)
Observe that, for a given tax rate τ , a higher level of religiosity, γ, implies a higher level
of voluntary donations, b, in equilibrium.
Next, using (4) and (8), we can write the agent’s after-tax income as
y(w; τ) = w + γw¯ + ((α− γ + αγ)w¯ − w)τ. (9)
Using equations (2), (3), and (9), the utility maximization problem determining the
preferred tax rate of an agent with income w can be expressed as:
max
τ∈[0,1]
log
(
1
1 + γ
y(w; τ)
)
+ γ log
(
γ
1 + γ
y(w; τ)
)
+ log((1− α)τw¯),
or, equivalently,
max
τ∈[0,1]
(1 + γ) log(y(w; τ)) + log(τ).
In the Appendix, we show that the second order condition for strict concavity of the
maximand is satisfied, guaranteeing a unique maximum. Ignoring for now the constraint on
τ and exploiting (9), the first order condition can be written as
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(1 + γ)
(α− γ + αγ)w¯ − w
w + γw¯ + ((α− γ + αγ)w¯ − w)τ +
1
τ
= 0,
which after rearrangement yields
τ(w) =
1
2 + γ
w + γw¯
w − (α− γ + αγ)w¯ . (10)
In order to ensure that 0 ≤ τ(w) ≤ 1 for all w ≥ 0, we impose the following restriction
on parameter values:6
Assumption: γ ≥ 2α
1−α .
In the Appendix, we show that dτ(w)
dw
< 0, that is, an individual’s desired tax rate is a
decreasing function of his position in the initial income distribution. Note, however, that
even the richest individual does not prefer a zero tax rate: Taking the limit of (10) as w
goes to infinity and applying the L’Hopital’s rule, we get τmin =
1
2+γ
, which is a number
greater than zero but less than 1/2. The intuition behind this result is a simple one: When
the tax rate is zero, the public good cannot be provided, which reduces the agent’s utility
to negative infinity.
Figure 1 below plots the preferred tax rate as a function of the before-tax/transfer income
under the above-mentioned assumption.
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Figure 1: Preferred tax rates
In order to determine the political-economic equilibrium of the economy, we must spec-
6Indeed, the assumption guarantees not only that 0 ≤ τ(w) ≤ 1, but also 0 < τ(w) < 1, thereby ensuring
an interior solution to the utility maximization problem. See the Appendix for a justification of this claim.
This assumption is a sufficient condition that simplifies the theoretical analysis by cutting down on the
number of cases to be analyzed, but do not otherwise affect the main conclusions of the paper.
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ify the collective choice mechanism. In this paper, we follow Meltzer and Richard (1981)
and consider a median voter rule, whereby the individual with median income chooses the
economy-wide tax rate. The median voter theorem is applicable in our setup since preferred
tax rates are decreasing with before-tax/transfer incomes (i.e. dτ(w)
dw
< 0) and the ordering
of before-tax/transfer incomes is independent of the tax-transfer policy. Setting w = wm in
equation (10), where wm denotes the median voter’s income, we obtain the equilibrium tax
rate τ ∗ = τ(wm). Therefore, the system of equations (2)-(6) together with (10) evaluated at
w = wm fully characterizes the political-economic equilibrium.
2.2 The Effect of Religiosity on the Equilibrium Tax Rate and
Government Size
We are now ready to consider the implications of religiosity for the equilibrium tax rate and
the size of the government. The following proposition summarizes the first main result of
the paper.
Proposition 1a dτ
∗
dγ
< 0. That is, an increase in the strength of belief in afterlife, γ, reduces
the equilibrium tax rate, τ ∗, in the economy.
The source of this decline is the increased weight attached to voluntary donations. The
median voter may or may not be a net beneficiary of government induced transfers, but still
votes for a positive tax rate since a portion of tax revenue is used in the provision of the
public good. Yet, the median voter has a desire to make voluntary donations, since there is
a direct satisfaction induced by donations he makes. Thus, the higher the income left over
after taxes and consumption, the more the agent has at his disposal to spend on charity,
and therefore the higher is his utility. As γ gets larger, so does the importance of voluntary
donations, reducing the tax rate preferred by the median voter.
Notice that Proposition 1a holds regardless of the position of the median voter in the
income distribution. That is, both relatively poor and relatively rich individuals prefer a
lower tax rate when the strength of belief in the afterlife, γ, is higher. When the median
voter is a relatively rich individual, the result of Proposition 1a reflects the preference that,
once a “satisfactory” amount of the public good is provided, he would prefer to carry out
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redistribution not through mandatory governmental means but voluntarily, as voluntary
redistribution provides direct satisfaction. A relatively poor median voter also prefers this
because it relaxes the budgets of the relatively well-off individuals, allowing them to make
larger donations, which in turn increases both his consumption and voluntary donations.
Our next result is about the size of the government and follows immediately from Propo-
sition 1a.
Proposition 1b d(τ
∗w¯)
dγ
< 0. That is, an increase in the strength of belief in afterlife, γ,
reduces the equilibrium size of the government, τ ∗w¯, in the economy.
The proof is straightforward and uses Proposition 1a in conjunction with the fact that
average income, w¯, is independent of the belief in afterlife, γ. Note that τ ∗w¯ = G∗ + v∗ by
equations (4) and (5). Therefore, Proposition 1b says that the sum of the spending on the
public good, G∗, and that on governmental redistribution, v∗, goes down with the strength
of belief in afterlife, γ.
Our final result here concerns the individual components of spending by the government.
Proposition 1c dG
∗
dγ
< 0 and dv
∗
dγ
< 0. That is, an increase in the strength of belief in
afterlife, γ, reduces both the equilibrium size of the public good, G∗, and the equilibrium size
of governmental redistribution, v∗, in the economy.
The proof of the result uses Proposition 1a and applies the chain rule of calculus to
equations (4) and (5) in equilibrium.
2.3 The Effect of Religiosity on Income Inequality
We next explore the implications of a higher γ for income inequality. Here, it is important
to distinguish between actual and measured income inequality. Measures of inequality are
generally based on measured rather than actual incomes. In our model, the measured part
of income is given by
y(w; τ ∗) = w(1− τ ∗) + ατ ∗w¯. (11)
That is, the part of income that is directly attributable to the strength of belief in afterlife,
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b∗ = γw¯(1 − (1 − α)τ ∗) (private donations received), is not generally taken into account,
at least not fully. Put differently, the equality-increasing effect of religion7 is typically not
included in measures of income. This might reflect the tendency of people to underreport
the transfers they received, the difficulty of observing donations received on an individual
basis by the government, or perhaps simply the unwillingness of authorities to conduct the
daunting task of necessary monitoring.8 Whatever the reason, it would suffice for us to focus
on the measured part of income given in equation (11).
In order to see how a higher γ might affect income inequality, consider two agents with
(measured) incomes y(w1; τ
∗) and y(w2; τ ∗), with y(w2; τ ∗) > y(w1; τ ∗). This obtains when-
ever w2 > w1. Let y(wi; τ
∗) = y∗i , i = 1, 2, for short. Simple differentiation yields
d(y∗2upslopey∗1)
dτ ∗
= −αw¯(w2 − w1) < 0, (12)
which follows since w2 > w1. That is, an increase in the tax rate τ
∗ brings y∗1 and y
∗
2 closer
together. Since y∗1 and y
∗
2 are arbitrary, this result holds for any such pair of individuals,
implying a compression of the income distribution. This finding should be intuitive since
the tax rate is proportional to and transfers are independent of before-tax/transfer incomes.
We can now apply the chain rule to obtain
d(y∗2upslopey∗1)
dγ
=
d(y∗2upslopey∗1)
dτ ∗
dτ ∗
dγ
> 0,
which follows since
d(y∗2upslopey∗1)
dτ∗ < 0 by (12) and
dτ∗
dγ
< 0 by Proposition 1a. Hence, the effect
of an increase in the strength of belief in afterlife is the opposite of the effect an increase in
the tax rate: It causes a “de-compression” of the income distribution. We, thus, have the
following result:
Proposition 2 An increase in the strength of belief in the afterlife, γ, increases income
inequality in the economy.
7Observe that db
∗
dγ = w¯(1− (1− α)τ∗)− γw¯(1− α)dτ
∗
dγ > 0 since
dτ∗
dγ < 0.
8Empirical evidence provided by studies such as Cox and Raines (1985) and Gale and Scholz (1994) does
indeed suggest that there is substantial underreporting of private transfers, and particularly so for transfers
received. As noted by Kessler and Masson (1989, p. 148), this might be attributed to “people’s tendency to
admit more easily that they have given than that they have received”.
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This implies that countries with higher levels of religiosity will be characterized by a
higher level of income inequality, that is, a higher gap between the income of the rich and
that of the poor.
2.4 The Effect of Religiosity on Consumption Inequality
Although the effect of religiosity on measured income inequality is clear, its effect on con-
sumption inequality (equivalently, actual income inequality) is less so. This is because,
unlike the previous section, we now take into account both the equality-reducing effect of
religion coming from lower governmental transfers, v∗, and the equality-increasing effect due
to higher donations received, b∗. In order to see how this changes our analysis, let us pick two
arbitrary agents with incomes w1 and w2, with w2 > w1. Let c(wi; τ
∗) = c∗i denote optimal
consumption levels for i = 1, 2. We are interested in the sign of the derivative
d(c∗2upslopec∗1)
dγ
. After
some algebra, the negative of this derivative can be shown to be proportional to
−d(c
∗
2upslopec∗1)
dγ
∝ (1− (1− α)τ ∗)(1− τ ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+α(1 + γ)
dτ ∗
dγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
. (13)
If the right hand-side (RHS) of this expression is negative, then
d(c∗2upslopec∗1)
dγ
> 0, and hence
consumption inequality rises with religiosity. If the RHS of this expression is positive, then
the opposite is true. Unfortunately, determining the sign of this term is difficult. Neverthe-
less, we can still perform some simple thought experiments. Note that when the tax rate τ ∗
is close to 1, the first term on the RHS is approximately 0, implying that the RHS is likely to
be less than zero. When τ ∗ is close to 0, on the other hand, the first term is approximately
equal to 1, and the second term is roughly 0 since the derivative dτ
∗
dγ
is likely to be small.9
We summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 An increase in the strength of belief in the afterlife, γ, may increase or
decrease consumption inequality, or leave it unchanged.
Propositions 2 and 3, taken together, point to the possibility that an increase in religiosity
9This is because, when the tax rate is already close to 0, a further fall in the tax rate would push the
level of the public good towards zero and hence reduce agents’ utilities towards negative infinity.
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may increase measured income inequality while reducing consumption inequality. Therefore,
given two countries identical in every way except the level of their religiosity, it is possible
for the country with the higher religiosity to be characterized by a higher level of (measured)
income inequality while having a lower level of consumption inequality.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we investigate whether the predictions of our theoretical model regarding
the relationship between religion, government fiscal policy (taxes, transfers, and government
spending) and inequality hold out in the data. We begin by describing the data and then
present results of several econometric estimations.
3.1 Data
Measuring how religious a country is a difficult task. There are several indices of religiosity
mostly created by surveys or using expert opinions, which by construction are prone to
measurement errors. Since we are mainly interested in accounting for cross-country variation
in income inequality, even though measures of religion might be imperfect, we can safely
assume that they are not systematically mis-measured across countries.10 Also, as expected,
these different religiosity indices are highly positively correlated with each other.11 That
is why one can safely use one of them without a crucial change in results. In this paper,
the results we report use the “belief in afterlife” index reported by the World Values Survey
conducted in 2000 as the relevant measure of religiosity due to its proximity to our theoretical
modeling of religion in the previous section.12
As the measure of inequality, we use the Gini index from the UNDP. The data on tax bur-
den, government spending to GDP ratio, and transfers to GDP ratio come from Government
Finance Statistics of the IMF. In addition, we use several control variables. GDP per-capita
data is taken from the Total Economy Database of the Groningen Growth and Development
10A list of the 59 countries used in this section’s analysis is provided in the Appendix.
11See Barro and McCleary (2002) on this point.
12The belief in afterlife index is also used by Barro and McCleary (2002) and Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001)
among others.
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Centre, and informal sector size estimates are from Schneider (2007). Following Alesina,
Campante and Tabellini (2008), we define a dummy variable, Democracy, in the following
way: We subtract the country’s score in an Autocracy index from its score in a Democracy
index (resulting in a range from -10 to 10) from the Polity IV Project database. Next, we
define our dummy variable Democracy which is equal to 1 if the result of the subtraction is
strictly positive and zero otherwise. Finally, data on fractions of different religions in each
country comes from La Porta et. al. (1999).
Considering the fact that several of our independent variables (namely, belief in afterlife,
GDP per-capita, transfers to GDP ratio, government spending to GDP ratio, and tax burden)
might be endogenous and/or be prone to measurement errors, we supplement our OLS
analysis with instrumental variables estimations. The instrumental variables we use include
latitude as in Hall and Jones (1999), an indicator variable for presidential vs. parliamentary
regimes as in Lederman et. al. (2005), and indicator variables for the legal system as in
La Porta et al. (1999). Table 1 provides a summary description of the data used in our
empirical analysis.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
3.2 Estimation and Results
We run several cross-section regressions using a different set of dependent and independent
variables. The first relation we examine is the one between income inequality and religion,
specifically, belief in afterlife. The regression equation we estimate for this purpose is of the
following form:
Ginii = β0 + β1Afterlifei +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i, (14)
where Xki are explanatory variables other than the belief in afterlife, and i is the country-
specific error term. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 2. Observe that
the coefficient of afterlife is significantly positive in all regressions no matter which control
variable is added. These results show that countries with higher levels of belief in afterlife
are also those with more unequal populations. Table 2 also shows that GDP per capita
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is consistently negative and highly significant in all regressions, indicating that countries
with higher per capita incomes tend to have more equal distributions of income. In these
regressions, we also check whether the level of democracy and the fraction of population
believing in each of the main religions play an important role in shaping the distribution of
income. None of these variables produces consistently significant estimates, however.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Having established the positive correlation between a specific dimension of religion (belief
in afterlife) and income inequality, we now want to investigate whether this relationship
runs through the mechanism suggested by our model in the previous section. Recall that,
in our model, religiosity reduces the level of tax burden (Proposition 1a, 1b) and the level
of governmental redistribution and government spending on public goods (Proposition 1c).
In order to check this mechanism, we basically run three regressions. First, we look at the
relationship between the tax burden and the belief in afterlife index. To do this, we estimate
the following equation:
Taxi = β0 + β1Afterlifei +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i, (15)
where Taxi stands for the tax burden, Xki are explanatory variables other than the belief
in afterlife, and i is the error term. The results of this estimation are presented in Table
3. Consistent with the prediction of our model in Proposition 1a, countries with higher
levels of belief in afterlife tend to have lower levels of tax burden. In these regressions, we
also include as control variables GDP per capita, informal sector size (IS), and the fraction
of population believing in each of the main religions. However, none of them produces
consistently significant estimates.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We next consider the bilateral relationships between religiosity and the individual com-
ponents of total government spending, that is, government spending on public goods and on
redistribution. As is well known, transfer payments constitute the main means of redistribu-
tion and include welfare payments (financial aid), social security expenditures, government
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subsidies, and the like. Government spending on public goods is simply all other spending
by the government. In order to test the first result stated in Proposition 1c, we replace tax
burden, Taxi, in equation (15) with government spending (on public goods) to GDP ratio,
GSi, and run the following regression:
GSi = β0 + β1Afterlifei +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i, (16)
The results of this estimation are reported in Table 4. The results indicate a clear
negative correlation between belief in afterlife and the level of government spending to GDP
ratio across countries, thus confirming the first result stated in Proposition 1c. Results
also indicate that GDP per capita is statistically significant and negatively correlated with
government spending to GDP ratio.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In order to test the second result stated in Proposition 1c, we run the following regression:
TRi = β0 + β1Afterlifei +
n∑
k=2
βkXki + i, (17)
where TRi denotes transfer payments, Xki are explanatory variables other than the belief in
afterlife, and i is the error term. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 5. In
line with model predictions, countries with higher levels of belief in afterlife have lower levels
of transfer payments. Just as in the previous regression, GDP per capita is significant, but
this time positively correlated with the dependent variable, transfers to GDP ratio.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Finally, it will also be of interest to estimate simultaneous system of equations, as this
allows us to evaluate the possible feedback effect from income inequality on the level of
tax burden, government spending, and/or transfer expenditures through belief in afterlife.
Here, we run nine simultaneous equations regressions, three using tax burden, three using
government spending to GDP ratio, and another three using transfers to GDP ratio. In
each case, we use three different methods to make the estimations: Ordinary least squares,
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three-stage least squares, and generalized method of moments. In order to minimize clutter,
we only report in Table 6 the results from the simultaneous estimation of equations for
taxes.13 Results suggest that the negative correlation between belief in afterlife and taxes,
government spending, and/or transfers seems to be quite robust to different econometric
specifications, even after taking into account the pairwise feedback effects between taxes,
transfers, and government spending on the one hand, and income inequality, on the other.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
4 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this study was to investigate the role religion plays in determining income in-
equality within a nation. To this end, we first developed a simple political-economy model
in which the more religious the individuals are, the higher is the satisfaction they get from
making voluntary donations. In order to be able to spend a higher portion of their incomes
on voluntary donations, the religious vote for lower levels of taxes as compared to secular
individuals. The political process thus results in a smaller government size in countries with
higher levels of religiosity, implying lower levels of spending on public goods and redistribu-
tion. Since tax-based redistribution is a major force shaping the distribution of income, our
model implies greater income inequality in more religious countries. Our model, therefore,
offers a novel mechanism that links religiosity with income inequality that is not based on
explanations that emphasize the role of religion in providing personal security and a coping
mechanism with socio-economic hardships.
We next showed that the predictions of our theoretical model hold up in cross-national
data. In particular, we provided evidence that the positive correlation between religiosity
and income inequality runs through the mechanism suggested by our theoretical model. Our
empirical results confirm the findings of Palani (2008) and Rees (2009), who find a positive
correlation between religiosity and income inequality, and the findings of Gill and Lunds-
gaarde (2004) and Scheve and Stasavage (2006), who find a negative correlation between
13The results are very similar for transfers and government spending. These estimation results are available
upon request.
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religiosity and state welfare spending. However, we went beyond these studies and showed
that religiosity is also negatively correlated with both total government spending (the size of
the government) and government spending excluding welfare payments. This finding suggests
that the religious might have an inherent preference for a smaller state, and that a smaller
welfare spending observed in more religious countries documented by previous studies might
just be a manifestation of this more general outlook.
We believe that future research could extend our findings in different directions. First,
the study of the relationship between religion and voluntary donations or religion and income
inequality in a microeconomic dataset would further test our claim that religious individuals
prefer voluntary donations over taxes. Second, it would be worthwhile to investigate in
detail the relationship between consumption inequality and religiosity in order to get a
better understanding of the extent religion affects societal well-being.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
1. Proof that the utility function is strictly concave in τ
Let Uˆ(w; τ) = (1 + γ) log(y(w; τ)) + log(τ), where y(w; τ) is given by equation (9). It is
enough to show that d
2Uˆ
dτ2
< 0. Differentiating twice we obtain
d2Uˆ
dτ 2
= −
(
(1 + γ)
(−w + w¯(α− γ + αγ))2
(w + γw¯ + (−w + w¯(α− γ + αγ))τ)2 +
1
τ 2
)
,
which is always negative since the expression inside the brackets is greater than zero. 
2. Proof that assumption γ ≥ 2α
1−α ensures that 0 < τ(w) < 1
Step 1 : γ ≥ 2α
1−α ⇒ τ(w) > 0
It is clear from equation (10) that τ(w) > 0 whenever the expression in the denominator,
w − (α− γ + αγ)w¯, is greater than zero. But, this is satisfied when γ ≥ 2α
1−α .
Step 2 : γ ≥ 2α
1−α ⇒ τ(w) < 1
Let θ ≡ α − γ + αγ and x ≡ w¯
wm
. Note that since F (w) is non-degenerate, w¯ > 0 and
wm > 0, and hence x > 0. Then, we can write equation (10) as
τ(w) =
1
2 + γ
1 + γx
1− θx ,
which is less than 1 if and only if
1 + γx < (2 + γ)(1− θx),
which after rearrangement yields
((2 + γ)θ + γ)x < 1 + γ. (18)
Now, using θ = α− γ + αγ, we can write
(2 + γ)θ + γ = (2 + γ)(α− γ + αγ) + γ
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= 2α− 2γ + 2αγ + αγ − γ2 + αγ2 + γ
= 2α− γ + 3αγ − γ2 + αγ2
= 2α− (1− 3α)γ − (1− α)γ2
= (2α− (1− α)γ)(1 + γ).
Then, expression (18) can be simplified to
(2α− (1− α)γ)x < 1,
or, using x = w¯
wm
,
(2α− (1− α)γ)w¯ < wm. (19)
It is easy to see that 2α− (1− α)γ ≤ 0 when γ ≥ 2α
1−α . Thus, condition (19) holds since
w¯ > 0 and wm > 0. 
3. Proof that dτ
∗(w)
dw
< 0
dτ ∗(w)
dw
=
1
2 + γ
w − (α− γ + αγ)w¯ − (w + γw¯)
(w − (α− γ + αγ)w¯)2
=
1
2 + γ
−(α− γ + αγ + γ)w¯
(w − (α− γ + αγ)w¯)2
=
1
2 + γ
−α(1 + γ)w¯
(w − (α− γ + αγ)w¯)2 ,
which is less than zero since α > 0, γ > 0, and w¯ > 0. 
4. Proof that ∂τ
∗
∂γ
< 0
Let x ≡ w¯
wm
and M ≡ 1− x(α− γ(1− α)). Then, we can write
τ ∗ =
1 + γx
2 + γ
1
M
.
Differentiating, we get
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∂τ ∗
∂γ
=
x
2 + γ
1
M
− 1 + γx
(2 + γ)2
1
M
+
1 + γx
2 + γ
1
M2
x(α− 1),
or,
∂τ ∗
∂γ
=
1
M(2 + γ)
(
x− 1 + γx
2 + γ
− 1 + γx
M
x(1− α)
)
.
Note that since γ ≥ 2α
1−α , we haveM > 0. Hence, it is enough to show that the expression
in parentheses is negative. Rewrite this expression as
1 + γx
2 + γ
+
1 + γx
M
x(1− α) > x,
and divide both sides by x to get
1 + γx
(2 + γ)x
+
1 + γx
M
(1− α) > 1. (20)
We are going to show that inequality (20) holds in three steps.
Step 1 : Suppose that x ∈ [0, 1
2
).
If the first term on the left hand side (LHS) in inequality (20) is greater than 1, then we
are done for this case, as the second term is always nonnegative. Hence, it suffices to show
that 1 + γx > 2x+ γx. But, this condition holds when x < 1
2
.
Step 2 : Suppose that x ∈ [1
2
, 1].
Rewrite (20) as
1 + γx
(2 + γ)x
+
1 + γx
1− x(α− γ(1− α))(1− α)−
1− x(α− γ(1− α))
1− x(α− γ(1− α)) > 0,
or,
1 + γx
(2 + γ)x
+
1− α+ γx− αγx
1− x(α− γ(1− α)) −
1− xα + γx− xγα
1− x(α− γ(1− α)) > 0,
or,
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1 + γx
(2 + γ)x
>
α(1− x)
1− x(α− γ(1− α)) . (21)
Let x ∈ [1
2
, 1]. If the following more stringent condition is satisfied, then expression (21)
must also be satisfied:
minx[1 + γx]
maxx[(2 + γ)x]
>
maxx[α(1− x)]
minx[1− x(α− γ(1− α))] ,
where both maximization and minimization are done over the set [1
2
, 1]. This yields
2 + γ
2 + γ
>
2α
2− (α− γ + γα) . (22)
Note that when γ ≥ 2α
1−α , we have α − γ + γα ≤ 0, and hence the denominator on the
RHS is greater than zero. Cross-multiplication then gives
2− (α− γ + γα) > 2α,
which is always true, since γ ≥ 2α
1−α implies that the LHS is at least 2 and α < 1 implies
that the RHS is strictly less than 2.
Step 3 : Suppose that x ∈ (1,∞).
We can write inequality (20) as
1 + γx
(2 + γ)x
+
1− α+ γx− αγx
1− αx+ γx− αγx > 1.
Observe that when x > 1 the second expression on the LHS is greater than 1. Since the
first expression is always nonnegative, the result follows.
Since we have established that ∂τ
∗
∂γ
< 0 for all x ≥ 0, we are done. 
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5.2 Tables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Gini 39.28 10.01 24.7 60.50
Belief in Afterlife 0.64 0.20 0.16 1
Tax Burden 0.30 0.15 0.01 0.68
GDP per-capita (in thousand GK$) 13.50 9.50 2.28 34.76
Transfers-to-GDP ratio 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.32
Government Spending-to-GDP ratio 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.39
Fraction of Catholics 40.45 40.60 0.00 96.90
Fraction of Protestants 12.45 23.07 2.00 97.80
Fraction of Muslims 14.37 31.07 0.00 99.40
Informal Sector Size 0.30 0.14 0.08 0.68
Indicator for Democracy 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Latitude 36.33 20.20 0.01 83.06
Indicator for French Legal System 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Indicator for British Legal System 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Indicator for German Legal System 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Indicator for Former Socialist Legal System 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Indicator for Presidential Regimes 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Table 2: Income Inequality and Religiona
Dependent Variable: Gini Index
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Belief in Afterlife 15.90*** 11.39** 13.31** 16.76** 70.81***
(3.28) (2.34) (2.58) (2.60) (3.34)
GDP per-capita -0.32*** -0.36*** -0.40*** -0.60**
(-3.25) (-3.04) (-3.12) (-2.37)
Indicator for Democracy 4.34 -1.44 -1.08
(1.32) (-0.46) (-0.94)
Fraction of Protestants 0.03 0.07
(0.90) (1.22)
Fraction of Catholics 0.08*** -0.02
(2.88) (-0.31)
Fraction of Muslims -0.08 -0.37***
(-1.42) (-2.84)
R-squared 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.45 0.40
Observations 57 57 57 57 57
F-Test 7.91 8.20 6.30 6.73 4.50
aHeteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence
levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.
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Table 3: Taxes and Religionb
Dependent Variable: Tax Burden
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Belief in Afterlife -0.28*** -0.19** -0.22** -0.29** -0.63**
(-3.09) (-2.04) (-2.56) (-2.41) (-2.04)
GDP per-capita 0.069*** 0.038** 0.029 0.17
(3.92) (2.03) (1.35) (0.96)
Informal Sector Size -0.30** -0.34** 0.54
(-2.31) (-2.17) (0.52)
Fraction of Protestants 0.03 0.001
(0.90) (0.76)
Fraction of Catholics 0.08*** 0.001
(2.88) (1.23)
Fractio of Muslims -0.08 0.003**
(-1.42) (2.42)
R-squared 0.15 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.37
Observations 57 57 57 57 57
F-Test 10.05 14.42 10.67 9.58 3.75
bHeteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence
levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.
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Table 4: Government Spending and Religionc
Dependent Variable: Government Spending to GDP ratio
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Belief in Afterlife -0.04** -0.09** -0.08** -0.19**
(-2.22) (-2.34) (-2.17) (-2.09)
GDP per-capita -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-4.16) (-4.86) (-4.93)
Fraction of Protestants 0.0003 0.0003
(1.28) (1.48)
Fraction of Catholics -0.0003* -0.0001
(-1.69) (-0.33)
Fraction of Muslims -0.00002 0.0006
(-0.04) (0.63)
R-squared 0.02 0.26 0.33 0.27
Observations 57 57 57 57
F-Test 2.54 9.52 4.96 4.76
cHeteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5 and 10% confidence
levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.
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Table 5: Transfers and Religiond
Dependent Variable: Transfers to GDP ratio
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Belief in Afterlife -0.24*** -0.17*** -0.18** -0.48***
(-4.82) (-3.34) (-2.17) (-3.17)
GDP per-capita 0.037*** 0.032** 0.035**
(4.08) (2.56) (2.18)
Fraction of Protestants 0.0004 0.0002
(0.88) (0.43)
Fraction of Catholics 0.0001 0.0006
(0.41) (1.43)
Fraction of Muslims 0.0001 0.002**
(0.32) (2.30)
R-squared 0.30 0.46 0.47 0.42
Observations 57 57 57 57
F-Test 22.54 21.91 9.58 3.75
dHeteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence
levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.
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Table 6: Income Inequality, Taxes, and Religion: Systems Estimationse
3SLS OLS GMM
Dependent Variable Gini Tax Gini Tax Gini Tax
Belief in Afterlife -0.21** -0.20** -0.22**
(-2.00) (-2.38) (-2.05)
GDP per-capita -0.16 -0.36*** -0.20
(-1.23) (-3.52) (-1.58)
Gini Index -0.005** -0.001** -0.003*
(-2.38) (-2.20) (-1.68)
Tax Burden -75.49*** -27.81*** -61.62***
(-5.67) (-4.39) (-3.82)
Informal Sector Size -0.40** -0.50*** -0.48***
(-2.06) (-4.36) (-2.88)
Fraction of Protestants 0.06 0.06 0.08
(1.23) (1.34) (1.52)
Fraction of Catholics 0.04 0.10*** 0.08**
(1.36) (3.88) (2.38)
Fraction of Muslims -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
(-1.00) (-0.82) (-0.42)
R-squared 0.10 0.40 0.52 0.41 0.30 0.40
Observations 79 57 79 57 79 57
eHeteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10% confidence
levels, respectively. In all regressions, a constant is also included but not reported.
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5.3 Countries
List of Countries Included in Estimations: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tai-
wan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
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